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LIABILITY FOR "SHORT SWING" TRADING
IN CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS
by
Robert Todd Lang* and Melvin Katz**
ECTION 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' was
enacted as a remedial measure to force corporate insiders to disgorge profits realized from "short swing" trading in the equity securities of listed companies. In 1964, Congress extended the coverage of
section 16(b) to the insiders of larger over-the-counter companies.'
As a result, section 16 (b) now affects a far greater number of officers,
directors and principal shareholders' of companies whose trading
activities were, prior to such amendments, beyond its reach.
Section 16(b) is now applicable to officers, directors and holders
of more than ten per cent of each class of the oustanding equity
securities of any issuer which has one or more outstanding classes of
securities either listed on a national securities exchange or registered
under section 12 (g) of the Exchange Act. 4 Briefly, it provides that
* Attorney at Law, New York City; A.B., LL.B., Yale.

** Attorney at Law, New York City; A.B., Wesleyan; LL.B., Harvard.
15 U.S.C. § 78a-jj. The statute is hereinafter referred to as the "Exchange Act."
'See § 12(g) (1) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78 1(g) (1)] pursuant to which
companies whose outstanding equity securities are traded solely in the over-the-counter
market, but whose total assets exceed $1,000,000 and which have more than 500 shareholders of record at the close of their first fiscal year ending after July 1, 1966, are now
required to register such class of securities with the SEC. By virtue of the amendments to
the Exchange Act in 1964, issuers in this category are now subject to the reporting requirements under § 13, the proxy regultions under § 14, and their officers, directors and the
holders of more than 10% of each class of their outstanding equity securities are subject
to the provisions of § 16.
aOfficers, directors and holders of more than 10% of any outstanding class of equity
securities of any issuer subject to the provisions of § 16 of the Exchange Act are referred
to throughout this Article as "insiders."
"The language of § 16(b) is as follows:
(b) For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of
his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase
and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other
than an exempted security) within any period of less than six months,
unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective
of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in
entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover
such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction by tho issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in
the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring
such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute
the same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought more than two years
after the date such profit was realized. This subsection shall not be construed
to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the
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any profits realized within a six-month period by any such "insider"
from each combination of purchase and subsequent sale, or sale and
subsequent purchase, of the equity securities of such issuer must be
repaid in full to the issuer. This enforces the statutory goal of precluding the use of inside information in making "short swing" profits.
As a parallel to section 16(b), Congress also enacted section 16(a)
which requires that insiders report their ownership of, and transactions in, securities of the issuer.'
time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase of the security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and
regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this
subsection,
15 U.S.C. § 78p (1963).
Reports under § 16(a) are filed on form 3 (the "initial" report) and form 4 (report
reflecting subsequent changes in the amount of securities held by the insider).
See Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARV.
L. REV. 385 (1952) for a discussion of the reporting requirements under § 16(a). See also
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 7794, 7795 concerning proposed amendments to
the reporting rules under § 16(a) with respect to the acquisition of "puts" and "calls"
and proposed revisions to forms 3 and 4 resulting therefrom.
While this Article is not concerned with technical questions under § 16(a), it should
be noted that, pursuant to SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7824 (originally published as SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7793), the SEC set forth its position respecting the definition of "beneficial ownership of securities" within the meaning of § 16(a).
In part, this constituted a restatement, albeit considerably expanded, of the SEC's earlier
interpretation of beneficial ownership of securities under the statute. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 175 (1935). Briefly, Release No. 7824 states that securities which
are held of record by a spouse or minor child of the reporting insider, shall, in the absence
of special circumstances, be regarded as owned beneficially by the reporting person. The release also indicates that where securities are held of record by any person pursuant to an
arrangement or contract whereby the reporting insider obtains benefits substantially equivalent to ownership, such securities are to be regarded as beneficially owned by such reporting
insider. The SEC's stated rationale for these expanded criteria in defining beneficial ownership
is based upon what may be called a "powers" test and a "benefits" test. These two tests are
directed toward ascertaining the substantive issue of economic benefits normally derived
from, or power to control the disposition or voting of securities normally associated with,
ownership of securities regardless of the form in which they are held. But the significance
of this expanded definition of beneficial ownership relates not merely to insiders' reporting
requirements under § 16(a). The implications of this release reach into the question of possible civil liability resulting from short swing trading under § 16(b). The Commission itself has hinted in Release No. 7824 that reporting ownership of shares held, for instance, by
a member of one's immediate family, does " . . . not necessarily mean that liability will
result therefrom under Section 16(b)." However, it is fair to assume that trading by such
persons exposes the insider to the serious possibility of liability under § 16(b). In this respect,
the meaning of the Commission's release is vague. However, see Marquette Cement Mfg. Co.
v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) where the court, referring to rule
16a-8 (17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-8) dealing with reporting of ownership of shares held in trust,
stated that the rules respecting reporting of ownership of shares under 16(a) have little
significance for determining liability under § 16(b).
In addition, § 16 also contains the following provisions:
(1) Section 16(c), which makes it unlawful for insiders to engage in "short sales" of
equity securities of the issuer, or to sell such securities and not make prompt delivery thereof-a practice commonly known as selling "against the box." See Silverman v. Landa, 200
F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aft'd, 306 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1962) for a discussion of the
provisions of § 16(c).
(2) Section 16(d), added by amendment in 1964, which exempts from the provisions
of §§ 16(b) and (c) over-the-counter securities transactions by insiders of companies whose
equity securities are registered under § 12(g) of the Exchange Act where such insider is a
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In addition to the power granted to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the SEC) to exempt certain securities transactions not
comprehended within the purposes of the statute, section 16 (b)
expressly excepts profits derived by insiders from trading in securities which were acquired in good faith "in connection with a debt previously contracted." This exception has been construed by the courts
to refer only to a security acquired by the insider in satisfaction of a
matured debt arising independent of any obligation to transfer such
security The statute further provides that it shall not be construed
to cover any transaction where "the beneficial holder of more than
10 per cent of the outstanding class was not such both at the time of
the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved." This exception has been construed by the courts so as to be
inapplicable to that purchase whereby such insider became the holder
of more than ten per cent of an outstanding class of equity securities
of the issuer.'
The contours of the statute as interpreted by the courts are relatively clear with respect to ordinary cash purchases and sales of securities by an insider within any six-month period. There are, of course,
numerous interpretative questions arising out of such ordinary securities transactions, including the computation of dividends in determindealer and where such transactions are undertaken in the ordinary course of such dealer's
business and incident to the establishment or maintenance of a primary or secondary market
in such security, provided that the exemption is not applicable to securities held in such
insider-dealer's investment account. In SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7905
(1966), the SEC has proposed the adoption of rule 16d-1 defining "securities held in an
investment account" and "transactions made in the ordinary course of business and incident
to the establishment or maintenance of a primary or secondary market." The apparent purpose of this proposed rule is to provide technical criteria to assure that the exemption under
§ 16(d) is only applicable to 'insider-dealers' who purchase and sell the issuer's securities
out of their trading inventory pursuant to their activities in making a continuous market
in such securities for a not insubstantial period of time.
(3) Section 16(e), which provides that § 16 shall not apply to foreign or domestic
"arbitrage transactions" (i.e., trading in securities involving price differentials between different markets or between one class of securities and another class of securities, such as a
warrant or a convertible security which is convertible into or exchangeable with the first
class) unless made in contravention of rules and regulations adopted by the SEC. See Falco
v. Donner Foundation, Inc., 208 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1953). The Commission has adopted
rule 16e-1 (17 C.F.R. § 240.16e-1) which states that it shall be unlawful for a director and
officers of an issuer of an equity security either listed on a national securities exchange or
registered under § 12(g) of the Exchange Act to effect any foreign or domestic arbitrage
transaction in such security unless such transactions are reported under § 16(a) and unless
any profits derived from such transactions are remitted to the issuer under § 16(b). Significantly, this rule does not impose such requirements upon a 10% shareholder. The effect
of this rule is to permit arbitrage transactions by an insider, although sharply curtailed, on
a basis exempt from the prohibitions of § 16(c) described above.
' Kheem Mfg. Co. v. Rheem, 295 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1961); Booth v. Varian Associates,
334 F.2d I (Ist Cir. 1964); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943). See
also Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984, 987 (2d Cir. 1947).
" Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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ing realized profits,' measurement of the six-month period,9 status as a
director at the time of purchase and sale of the securities,"0 tolling of
the applicable two-year statute of limitations," categories of employees who may be deemed officers,'" settlement of actions under section 16 (b) ," and interpretation of its two express exceptions referred
to above. However, these questions, which are the subject of precedent or have been well analyzed elsewhere,"' are not the primary concern of this Article. Rather, this Article is directed toward an analysis
of problems arising from the application of section 16 (b) to non-cash
transactions, including corporate reorganizations, acquisitions and reclassifications. The form of these transactions is frequently determined
by tax, commercial, anti-trust or other considerations, and ideally the
perimeters of section 16 (b) should be carefully delineated so as to accomplish only the statutory objective of curbing speculative abuse by
insiders in the context of corporate transactions which often serve salutary purposes for the corporations involved and their shareholders.
Despite these considerations, the application of section 16 (b) to these
transactions has sometimes led to harsh, uncertain and unanticipated
results.
DEFINITION OF "PURCHASE AND SALE"

UNDER SECTION 16(b)
Liability under section 16 (b) often turns upon a determination of
when a "purchase" or a "sale" of securities has occurred for section
16(b) purposes. Section 3(a) (13) of the Exchange Act defines
SWestern Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966). But see note 75 infra.
'Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
'"Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840
(2d Cir. 1959).
"1Grossman v. Young, 72 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Carr-Consol. Biscuit Co. v.
Moore, 125 F. Supp. 423 (M.D. Pa. 1954); Blau v. Albert, 157 F. Supp. 816 (S.D.N.Y.
1957).
"2 Rule 36-2 (17 C.F.R. S 240.3b-2) under Exchange Act. See Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d
872 (2d Cir. 1949); Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Rathman, 106 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Cal.
1952); and Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Campbell, 10 F. Supp. 282 (S.D. Cal. 1953). See also
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 2687 (1940).
"See, e.g., Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See also Fleisher,
34 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 214-15 (1965).
"4See, e.g., 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION, 1040-1121 (1961); Cole, Insiders' Liabilities Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 12 Sw. L.J. 147 (1958); Cook & Feldman,
Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARV. L. REV. 385 (1952); Hardee,
Stock Option and the "Insider Trading" Provision of the Securities Exchange Act, 65
HASv. L. REV. 997 (1952); Rubin & Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use of
Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 468 (1947); Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers and Stockholders: Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act,
38 MICH. L. REv. 133 (1939); Note, The Scope of "Purchase and Sale" Under Section
16(b) of the Exchange Act, 59 YALE L.J. 510 (1950); Meeker & Cooney, The Problem of
Definition In Determining Insider Liabilities Under Section 16(b), 45 VA. L. REv. 949
(1959).
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"purchase" to include "any contract to buy, purchase or otherwise
acquire," and section 3 (a) (14) defines "sale" to include "any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of."' 5 These statutory definitions do
not furnish explicit direction with respect to the treatment under
section 16 (b) of insiders' securities transactions in corporate reorganizations, acquisitions, reclassifications and conversions. Therefore, in
applying the concept of "purchase" and "sale" to securities transactions in this area, it is necessary to examine the purposes underlying
the enactment by Congress of section 16(b).
The preamble to section 16 (b) states that it was enacted, "For the
purpose of preventing the unfair use of inside information which
may have been obtained by [insiders]. . . ." This would seem to require that the courts determine whether the particular securities transactions under scrutiny are susceptible to the possibility of abuse of
inside information. On the other hand, section 16 (b) sets forth a
seemingly automatic rule which imposes liability upon insiders for
any trading resulting in a profit within any period of six months or
less, regardless of the intentions or purposes of the insiders engaged
in such trading or other similar extrinsic considerations."0 Those provisions would appear to preclude inquiry by the courts beyond the
question of whether the insider's purchase and sale of the securities
were both made within the statutory period. Thus, there are conflicting approaches to the imposition of liability under the statute
which have led to confusion and uncertainty. This conflict has been
demonstrated most often in cases dealing with conversions of securities. Accordingly, a review of these cases furnishes a useful background to the interpretation of section 16 (b) with respect to insider's
securities transactions in corporate reorganizations, acquisitions and
reclassifications.
THE "CONVERSION" CASES

In Park & Tilford v. Schulte,' the first reported decision in this
area, the Second Circuit, adopting an objective, "rule of thumb"
approach, held that the defendant's conversion of preferred stock
into common stock constituted a "purchase" of such common stock
for section 16(b) purposes which rendered the insiders liable for
profits derived from a sale of the common stock within six months
after the date of such conversion. In reaching this decision, the SecU.S.C. 78c(a) (13), (14).
Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6557 (1934); 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION, 1040-44
15 15
'"

(1961).
17

160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
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ond Circuit stated in substance that any conversion of one class of
securities into another class of securities of the same issuer constituted
a "purchase" within the meaning of section 3 (a) (13) of the Exchange Act as a "contract ...to acquire."" This reflected the court's
adoption of what has since been viewed as an "automatic" interpretation of the statute with respect to any combination of acquisitions
and dispositions of securities within any six-month period. 1 However, in 1958, in Ferraiolo v. Newman,' ° the Sixth Circuit reached a
result contrary to the Park & Tilford approach by holding that the
conversion of preferred stock into common stock in that case was not
a "purchase" which could be matched with a subsequent sale of the
underlying common stock to impose liability under section 16(b).
In Ferraiolo, the court found that there was no evidence that the
insider controlled the issuer's decision to call the preferred stock for
redemption which resulted in a "forced" conversion; it further found
that the convertible preferred and common stock were "economic
equivalent[s]" in terms of values ascribed to both classes of such
securities in the market.21 This decision placed heavy emphasis upon
the stated purpose of the statute to prevent the use of inside information for speculative purposes rather than upon a "rule of thumb"
approach which would preclude inquiry into such extrinsic factors
as the insider's lack of actual control of the issuer." The very fact
that the Sixth Circuit sought to distinguish the, decision of the Second
Circuit in the Park & Tilford case on these grounds reflected its
refusal to be bound solely by the ostensibly objective language of
section 16(b). The different approaches of the Second and Sixth
Circuits to conversions under section 16(b) were reflected in decisions subsequently rendered by the Ninth Circuit and by a district
court in Minnesota.*
I d. at 987.
Meeker & Cooney, The Problem of Definition in Determining Insider Liabilities
Under Section 16(b), 45 VA. L. REv. 949, 961-65 (1959).
20259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
"Id. at 345-46.
22 Ibid.
2 Until recently the conflicting positions taken by the different courts evidenced
"See

the confusion resulting from the two different interpretative approaches to § 16(b).
Thus, in Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 892 (1965), the Ninth Circuit held that the conversion by insiders of one class
of common stock into another class of common stock, both of which classes being in all
respects alike except with respect to dividend rights, did not constitute a "purchase." On its
facts, this case went even further than the Ferraiolo case since the insiders were clearly controlling persons (as they were in the Park & Tilford case) and since the conversion was
clearly preparatory to a public offering. This case led to the adoption by the SEC of rule
16b-9, [17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-9, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7118 (1963)]
which retroactively exempted an exchange of shares of one class of securities for another
which have the same rights and privileges except for dividend rights. Rule 16b-9 was sub-
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Two recent court decisions have highlighted the dilemma of the
courts in applying section 16(b) to conversions. These two cases,
Heli-Coil. v. Webster" and Blau v. Lamb,"s are also significant because of the light they shed on the analogous problem of applying
section 16(b) to insiders' transactions incident to a corporate reorganization.
In the Heli-Coil case a director converted convertible debentures
into common stock within six months after the date of their purchase
and sold the common stock within six months after the date of such
conversion (but more than six months after the date of purchase of
the debentures). The questions presented to the Third Circuit were:
(1) whether the conversion of the convertible debentures into common stock constituted a "purchase" of the common stock within the
meaning of section 16(b), and (2) whether that same act of conversion of the debentures into the common stock constituted a "sale"
of such debentures which could be matched with their prior purchase.
Thus, the court was obliged to consider two separate counts of potential section 16(b) liability arising out of a single act of conversion
of a security which could be matched with a prior purchase of the
convertible security and a subsequent sale of the underlying security.
sequently amended in 1966 by SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7826, CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 5 77329. See note 34 infra and accompanying text for a description of the
provisions and significance of rule 16b-9. On the other hand, in Pettys v. Northwest Airlines,
246 F. Supp. 526 (D. Minn. 1965), a district court followed the Park el Tilford approach
even though the facts more closely resembled the facts in the Ferraolo case. In the Pettys
case, two non-controlling directors of the issuer who held convertible preferred for more
than six months, converted such preferred stock to avoid redemption and then sold the
common stock within six months after the conversion. The court specifically rejected the
Ferraiolo and Max Factor holdings and held that the conversion constituted a "purchase" of
securities within the meaning of § 16(b). The district court's holding was reversed by a
decision rendered by the Eighth Circuit in October 1966 (CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
90,828) wherein the court held that a conversion of preferred stock into common stock did
not constitute a "purchase" within the meaning of section 16(b). In reaching this result
the Eighth Circuit, after reviewing the precedents, including Blau v. Max Factor, held that
where the marketable convertible preferred stock and the underlying common stock were
economic equivalents in the market place, the act of conversion did not alter the insider's
investment risk and hence did not involve a transaction which would be susceptible to the
possibility of speculative abuse. In reaching this decision, the Eighth Circuit employed reasoning which parallels that of the Second Circuit in Blau v. Lamb. See discussion in text
accompanying notes 29-33 infra.
* AUTHOR's NoTE: In October 1966 the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court in
Minnesota in the case of Pettys v. Northwest Airlines, by holding that a conversion of
preferred stock into common stock did not constitute a "purchase" within the meaning of
section 16(b). This very recent decision of the Eighth Circuit in the Pettys case reflects
the same philosophy as that taken by the Second Circuit in Blau v. Lamb except that the
language in the Pettys case might well indicate that the Eighth Circuit would adopt a more
flexible approach than the Second Circuit in deciding upon cases involving conversions or
corporate reorganizations under section 16(b). It would appear that at present the judicial
approach to section 16(b) embodied in the Ferraiolo case may well represent the dominant
approach of the various circuits in this area.
24352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
95,352 F,2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965); CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 91,710.
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The court, following Park &qTilford, held that the conversion of the
debentures constituted a "purchase" of the common stock which
could be combined with a subsequent sale of such stock to impose
liability under section 16 (b)." However, while it also held that the
conversion constituted a "sale" of the debentures which could be
matched up with their prior purchase, the court imposed no section
16(b) liability since such "sale" did not result in the "realization of
profit." Its basis for this conclusion was that the convertible debentures and the underlying common stock were "substantial economic
equivalent[s]" and that the paper value of the debentures held by
the insider did not materialize into "real" value by reason of the
conversion." The decision in Heli-Coil, which was urged upon it by
the amicus brief of the SEC,"8 represents a compromise between a
strict adherence to the Park & Tilford approach and an effort to avoid
the harsh consequences upon the insider resulting from that approach.
This is evidenced by the fact that, despite its refusal to impose liability upon the insider by reason of that aspect of the conversion which
it held to constitute a "sale," the court nevertheless found such liability by matching the conversion of the debentures as a "purchase" with
the subsequent sale of the underlying common stock even though such
underlying stock was sold more than six months after the date of the
purchase by the insider of the convertible debentures.
In June, 1966, the Second Circuit decided Blau v. Lamb,"' which
involved, among other securities transactions, the acquisition of convertible preferred stock of a company by a principal shareholder incident to a merger and a later conversion of such preferred stock into
common stock of the same company within six months of the acquisition. The district court had held that the acquisition of the convertible preferred stock pursuant to the merger constituted a "purchase"
within the meaning of section 16 (b), and this was not contested on
appeal."° The Second Circuit held that the conversion of the preferred
stock into shares of common stock within six months after the date
of the admitted "purchase" of the preferred did not constitute a "sale"
within the meaning of section 16(b). In reaching this result, the
court rejected an automatic construction of section 16 (b), preferring
2 For a comprehensive discussion by Judge Biggs of the conflicting philosophies theretofore adopted by the courts with respect to imposing 5 16(b) liability in the area of conversion of securities, see Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 161-67 (3d Cir. 1965).
STId. at 167.
21 Id. at 169-70.
2 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 91,710. According to CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. Bulletin 120
(Nov. 3, 1966), a petition for certiorari has been filed in Blau v. Lamb.

30Id.

at 5 95,611.
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instead to determine whether the transaction in question could possi-

bly lend itself to speculative abuse. Thus, Judge Waterman stated:
To be sure, the theory of regulation underlying Section 16(b)'s
regulatory mechanism provides a sufficient reason for refusing to examine the details of transactions once it has been determined that they
might possibly have served as vehicles for unfair insider trading. But
it does not supply an equally sufficient reason for applying Section
16(b) in this same automatic fashion when a substantial question is
raised whether a certain conversion transaction permits a possibility of
insider abuse. Congress adopted the sweeping, arbitrary regulatory mechanism embodied in Section 16 (b) in order to insure that even the
possibility of insider abuse was deterred, but it would seem to follow
that in order to avoid 'purposeless harshness' a court should first inquire whether a given transaction could possibly tend to accomplish
the practices Section 16(b) was designed to prevent. Blau v. Max Factor & Co., supra at 307. [Emphasis added.]"'
Having adopted this flexible approach, the court found that there
could be no such speculative abuse because the convertible preferred
stock and the common stock were "economic equivalents" in terms of
market values and that, in consequence, the conversion did not constitute a change in the investment position of the insiders. However, it
carefully limited the concept of economic equivalence to those situations where the convertible security had an ascertainable market value
and where such market value was at least equal to the market value
of the underlying security." Thus, where the Third Circuit in HeliCoil relied upon the test of "economic equivalence" to determine that
no profit had been "realized" within the meaning of the statute so
as to avoid imposition of a harsh and inequitable liability, the Second
Circuit in Blau v. Lamb employed the concept of "economic equivalence" as the basis for its finding that the possibility of speculative
abuse was non-existent.
One of the most significant aspects of the decision in Blau v. Lamb
is that the same circuit which was responsible for the automatic approach to section 16(b) exemplified by the Park & Tilford case has
now rejected an automatic approach to the interpretation of section
16(b) in the area of convertible securities. That Judge Waterman
expressly limited the court's holding to the facts of the case and declined to rule, for instance, on acts of conversion followed or preceded by purchases or sales of the underlying security" does not invalat Id. at 5 95,613.
321d. at 55 95,615-16.
"Id. at 55 95,616-17. The court was most careful to restrict its holding to the facts
present. However, it set forth four prototype situations, the first of which involved its
holding that a purchase of convertible preferred stock followed by a conversion of such stock
into common stock within six months thereafter did not constitute a "sale" of the con-
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idate the conclusion that the Second Circuit has now adopted a philosophy in applying section 16(b) which parallels that of the Sixth
Circuit in Ferriaolo.*
In February, 1966, the SEC amended rule 16b-9' to provide that
vertible security. It expressly declined to rule, however, on the three following prototype
situations:
(i) The conversion by an insider of preferred stock held for more than six months
which is followed by another purchase of such convertible preferred stock at
a lower price within six months after the date of conversion.
(ii) A sale of the underlying common stock within six months prior to the date of
conversion of the convertible preferred stock, where such sale is at a higher
price than the conversion price; and
(iii) Where the sale of the underlying common stock occurs within six months after
the date of conversion of the preferred stock.
With respect to these prototypes, Judge Waterman, in limiting the court's holding, again
restated the view that, prior to imposing liability under § 16(b), a judge should first
ascertain whether any possibility of speculative abuse was presented under the facts of each
such prototype. Significantly, Judge Waterman, bowing perhaps to the force of Park rJ
Tilford as precedent, indicated that this type of analysis might lead to the conclusion that
a conversion when followed by a sale of the underlying security within six months thereafter might constitute a "purchase" of such underlying security even though the same act
of conversion might not constitute a "sale" of the convertible security purchased within six
months prior thereto. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91,710 at 95,617. These limitations upon
its holding indicate that the Second Circuit's decision in Blau v. Lamb is considerably narrower than the scope of the exemption provided by the recent amendment to rule 16b-9 discussed in the text accompanying notes 34-37 infra.
* AUTHOR'S NOTE: In October 1966 the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court in
Minnesota in the case of Pettys v. Northwest Airlines, by holding that a conversion of
preferred stock into common stock did not constitute a "purchase" within the meaning of
section 16(b). This very recent decision of the Eighth Circuit in the Pettys case reflects
the same philosophy as that taken by the Second Circuit in Blau v. Lamb except that the
language in the Pettys case might well indicate that the Eighth Circuit would adopt a more
flexible approach than the Second Circuit in deciding upon cases involving conversions or
corporate reorganizations under section 16(b). It would appear that at present the judicial
approach to section 16(b) embodied in the Ferraiolo case may well represent the dominant
approach of the various circuits in this area.
3417 C.F.R. § 240.16b-9, amended by SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7826
(1966), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 77,329. The text of the amendment to rule 16b-9 is as
follows:
(a) Any acquisition or disposition of an equity security involved in the conversion of an equity security which, by its terms or pursuant to the terms of
the corporate charter or other governing instruments, is convertible immediately or after a stated period of time into another equity security of the same
issuer, shall be exempt from the operation of Section 16(b) of the Act; Provided, however, that this rule shall not apply to the extent that there shall
have been either (i) a purchase of any equity security of the class convertible
(including any acquisition of or change in a conversion privilege) and a sale of
any equity security of the class issuable upon conversion, or (ii) a sale of any
equity security of the class convertible and any purchase of any equity security issuable upon conversion, (otherwise than in a transaction involved in
such conversion or in a transaction exempted by any other rule than under
Section 16(b)). within a period of less than six months which includes the
date of conversion.
(b) For the purpose of this rule, an equity security shall not be deemed to
be acquired or disposed of upon conversion of any equity security if the terms
of the equity security converted require the payment or entail the receipt,
in connection with such conversion, of cash or other property (other than
equity securities involved in the conversion) equal in value at the time of
conversion to more than 15% of the value of the equity security issued upon
conversion.
(c) For the purpose of this rule, an equity security shall be deemed con-

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:472

the acquisition or disposition of an equity security upon conversion
of one class of such security into another class of equity security of
the same issuer shall be exempt from the operation of section 16 (b).
This exemption is subject, however, to the proviso that it is not
deemed applicable to the extent that there has been a combination of
either a "purchase" of the convertible security and a "sale" of the
underlying security, or a "sale" of the convertible security and a
"purchase" of the underlying security, within any period of less than
six months, which includes the date of the conversion."5 The rule also
qualifies the exemption by providing that an equity security shall
not be deemed to have been acquired or disposed of upon conversion
if, in connection with such conversion, the insider either receives
or is required to pay cash or other property equal to more than fifteen
per cent of the value of the underlying securities issued upon such
conversion."6 As amended, rule 16b-9 renders academic the existing
court decisions with respect to the application of section 16(b) to
conversions. Moreover, rule 16b-9 now exempts securities transactions
involving conversions which the court in Blau v. Lamb was careful
to exclude from its narrow holding that a conversion of preferred
stock within six months after the date of purchase did not constitute a "sale" of the preferred stock for section 16 (b) purposes. Thus,
where the Second Circuit, by way of illustration, specifically left open
the question of liability under section 16(b) for conversions preceded or followed by a sale or purchase of the underlying security
within a period of six months from the date of such conversion, 37
such combination of transactions would clearly be exempt under
rule 16b-9 unless the purchase of the convertible security, the conversion, and the sale of the underlying security all occurred within
a six-month period. This amendment to rule 16b-9 demonstrates the
willingness of the SEC to use its broad statutory power to promulgate
a general rule which resolves problems created by conflicting interpretations of section 16 (b).
CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS
AND SECTION

16(b)

The conversion cases are only partly applicable to corporate reorganizations and acquisitions which involve transactions in the securities of more than one issuer. For purposes of section 16(b), such
vertible if it is convertible at the option of the holder or of some other person
or by operation of the terms of the security or the governing instruments.
35 17 C.F.R.
240.16b-9(a).
3 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-9(b).
" See note 33 supra.
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reorganizations and acquisitions involve potential liabilities to the
insider which may arise from the transfer or exchange of the securities of one corporation for those of a second or third corporation.
In dealing with insider's securities transactions arising out of corporate mergers and others types of reorganizations, the courts have,
subject to certain exceptions noted below, adopted the automatic,
objective approach exemplified by the Park &YTilford decision. The
first case to deal with a corporate reorganization was Blau v. Hodgkinson" which involved the merger and liquidation of several subsidiaries into their corporate parent. A director of the corporate parent,
who held securities of one of such subsidiaries prior to the merger and
received shares of the parent upon liquidation of the subsidiary, was
held accountable under section 16(b) by reason of profits derived
from a sale of the parent's shares within six months after the date
of such liquidation. The district court in the Hodgkinson case held
that an exchange of shares pursuant to the statutory merger of a subsidiary into a parent corporation constituted a "purchase" by the
insider of the shares of the parent. The court stressed the element of
choice which was available to the shareholder of the subsidiary and,
in effect, stated that the acquisition by him of the parent's share was
"voluntary" because the defendant could have dissented from the
merger and exercised his statutory appraisal rights under state law."
Similarly, in Stella v. Graham-PaigeMotors Corp.,4 the Second Circuit held that the exchange of assets by Graham-Paige for stock
of Kaiser-Fraser constituted a "purchase" of the latter's securities for
section 16(b) purposes which could be matched with the sale of
such stock within six months thereafter to invoke liability. More
recently, a district court arrived at a similar result in the case of
Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas' where it held that an exchange of assets" by one corporation for shares of another corporation followed by liquidation of the former constituted a "purchase"
of such shares by the shareholders of such former corporation upon
its liquidation. The court matched this "purchase" of such shares
with their subsequent sale to find liability under section 16(b). In
addition, in Fistel v. Christman," a case involving a transfer of the
80 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y.
RId. at 373.

1951).

40232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1956).
41239 F. Supp. 962

(S.D.N.Y.

1965).

" Ibid. The insiders in the Marquette Cement case included a corporation and a trust of
which one of the insiders was a beneficiary. See note 5 supra, respecting the view of the
court in this case that the reporting rules under 5 16(a) have only slight significance in
determining liability under § 16(b)
4135
F. Supp. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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outstanding shares by shareholders of one corporation in exchange
for shares of another corporation, a district court, although finding
that there was no recoverable profit under the facts of that case,
nevertheless held that such transfer constituted a "purchase" for
section 16(b) purposes. Most recently, the district court in Blau
v. Lamb" held, after citing the Hodgkinson and Graham-Paigecases,
that the exchange by an insider of common shares of one corporation
for preferred shares of another corporation pursuant to a merger
constituted a "purchase" of such preferred shares within the meaning of section 16 (b), and this holding was not contested on appeal to
the Second Circuit.' Significantly, the court in Blau v. Lamb stated
that the test of "economic equivalence" with respect to conversion of
one class of securities into another class of the same issuer would have
no applicability where the insider exchanged securities of the issuer
for securities of a different issuer." In this respect Blau v. Lamb is also
consistent with the Hodgkinson, Graham-Paige, and Marquette Cement cases where the holdings implicitly, but properly, reject the
application of the concept of "economic equivalence" to a transfer of
securities or assets of one issuer in exchange for securities of another
issuer.
On the other hand, the Second Circuit in Blau v. Mission Corp.4"
held that the transfer by an insider corporate parent to its whollyowned subsidiary of shares of a third corporation in exchange
for shares of such subsidiary did not constitute a "sale" by such parent within the meaning of section 16 (b)," and there is dictum in the
Marquette Cement case to the effect that a transaction would not be
deemed within the purview of section 16 (b) where "elements which
convince the court that manipulation is impossible" are present."'
In 1954, in Roberts v. Eaton,"° which involved a reclassification of
the shares of an issuer after approval by shareholders pursuant to applicable statutory procedure, the Second Circuit held that such reclassification did not constitute a "purchase" within the meaning of
section 16 (b) which would be matched up with a private sale of such
shares one month thereafter. Emphasizing the like treatment of all
44242 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
4'CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91,710 at 95,611.
41Id. at 95,616.
4'212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1954).
48 In Blau v. Lamb, supra, the court extended the holding of Blau v. Mission Corp. to
apply to a 97% owned subsidiary of the insider, indicating that, even though it could not
fix a precise limit with respect to this question, the transfer of securities to a 979 owned
subsidiary in no way increased the insider's power to make use of the inside information
which § 16(b) is designed to preclude. CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 91,710 at 95,619.
49 239 F. Supp. at 966.
" 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1954).
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shareholders and the retention by the insiders of the same proportionate equity interests in the issuer,"' the court specifically found that
the reclassification could not possibly lend itself to the speculative
abuse which section 16 (b) was designed to prevent, thereby adopting
an approach in the area of reclassification which was consistent with
that in Ferraiolo and Blau v. Lamb with regard to conversions of
securities of the same issuer.
Except for Blau v. Mission Corp. and Roberts v. Eaton, the courts
have reached decisions respecting section 16 (b) which may be justifiably regarded as imposing unintended hardships on corporate insiders. The decision in Blau v. Lamb, however, indicates that now the
courts may, by relating the imposition of liability under the statute
only to such transactions as involve the possibility of abuse of inside
information, be attempting to avoid such harsh results. The question
remains whether this interpretative approach will be applied to the
area of corporate reorganizations and like transactions. The companion question is whether the courts, required to deal with complicated
corporate transactions on a case by case basis, can enunciate a general
rule which will both restrict section 16 (b) liability to those transactions as fall within its purpose and serve as a clear guide to corporate
insiders and their counsel. Therefore, to achieve both the discriminating and equitable purposes which the Blau v. Lamb approach to section 16(b) is intended to serve and at the same time avoid the uncertainties which that approach is likely to yield, it would be preferable if
the interpretative problems presented in this area were resolved by a
specific SEC rule exempting acquisitions or dispositions of securities
incident to a corporate reorganization as transactions "not comprehended within the purpose of" section 16 (b)."'
Corporate reorganizations and acquisitions are accomplished
55

1d. at 83-85.
"aExisting rule 16b-7, promulgated by the SEC in 1952 (17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-7), adopted
by SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4717 (1952) only has applicability to acquisitions or dispositions of securities pursuant to mergers, consolidations (including, by definition in rule 16b-7(b), exchanges of assets for securities) involving 85% or more owned
subsidiaries (or companies owning 85% or more of the combined book values of the companies which are parties to the transaction) and therefore it is not applicable to the situation
where two or more previously unaffiliated corporations become parties to a corporate reorganization. The discussion in this Article is devoted to an analysis of problems posed by
§ 16(b) in the context of corporate reorganizations involving previously unaffiliated corporations. See note 70 infra, respecting the limitations upon the scope of the exemption provided by this rule which are set forth in rule 16b-7(c).
In addition, rule 16b-6(c) (17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6(c)) also provides a limited exemption
with respect to the disposition of a security pursuant to a merger, consolidation, reclassification of securities, or exchange of assets for securities where such security was acquired
upon exercise of an option or pursuant to an employment agreement which was granted or
entered into more than six months prior to such exercise. The rule specifically requires that
such merger, consolidation, reclassification or exchange of assets for securities be binding
upon shareholders except for the exercise of statutory appraisal rights which may be available.
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through various methods which are undertaken to satisfy specific
financial, corporate or tax objectives. Principally, such transactions
involve either mergers, consolidations, exchanges of securities by the
shareholders of Corporation A (A) for securities of Corporation B
(B), or exchanges of assets of A for securities of B followed by a
liquidation of A and the distribution of B's securities to the shareholders of A. The form of the transaction should be of little consequence in determining whether the insider's trade lends itself to speculative abuse. Regardless of which method of corporate reorganization
or acquisition is employed, however, it may be assumed that there is
no section 16(b) liability resulting solely from a matching of the
acquisition (a "purchase") by the insider of equity securities of B
in exchange for the disposition (a "sale") of equity securities of A. By
its terms, section 16 (b) reaches only the combination of a purchase
and sale of equity securities of one issuer resulting in a profit, and, accordingly, the event of the reorganization, itself, does not give rise to
liability thereunder. However, serious interpretative problems under
section 16 (b) arise out of the matching of the "purchase" or "sale" of
equity securities incident to the merger or other form of corporate
reorganization with any prior or subsequent acquisition or disposition of such securities by an insider subject to the provisions of section
16 (b). The main problem in this area may be illustrated by the two
following prototype fact situations which appear applicable regardless of the form of reorganization employed."
The first of these prototype situations is where the insider has made
a purchase of equity securities of A within six months prior to the date
of the merger of A into B or the acquisition of A by B-in effect,
where such prior purchase of securities of A may be matched up with
the subsequent transfer or exchange of such securities pursuant to the
reorganization (a "sale" for section 16(b) purposes) to invoke liability under the statute. While it is evident that an insider of A
might possibly have used inside information in connection with the
purchase of the equity securities of A within six months of the reorganization, it is doubtful if such "purchase" should be matched with
the "sale" of such securities arising by reason of such reorganization.
To the extent that the insider of A receives equity securities of B
upon the reorganization, such insider does not realize a profit by reason of the reorganization. Realization in an economic sense only oc-

curs when the insider of A sells the securities of B or receives cash or
"' These prototype illustrations are based upon the factual assumption that the insider of
A does not become an insider of B until such time as the reorganization is consummated.
Clearly, different results could obtain if the insider of A is also an insider of B prior to the
reorganization. See paragraph (ii) of note 54 infra.
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non-equity securities of B pursuant to the reorganization." It does not
occur where the insider is receiving only equity securities of B in exchange and substitution for his equity securities of A pursuant to the
reorganization and where he occupies the same position as all other
holders of equity securities of the same class of A. Thus, the absence
of realization is further demonstrated by the fact that the transfer of
securities of A incident to the reorganization does not alter the insider's proportionate equity interest in relation to the interests of all other
holders of the same class of equity securities of A. Therefore, the event
of the reorganization should not be deemed the determining factor
in terms of the prevention of speculative abuse under section 16 (b).
The second prototype situation involves the acquisition by the
insider of A of equity securities of B incident to a merger or other
form of corporate reorganization (i.e., a "purchase" for section 16 (b)
purposes) and the subsequent sale of such securities by such insider
within six months thereafter. It is particularly in this area where, as
illustrated by the decisions in the Hodgkinson and Marquette Cement
cases, the imposition of liability under section 16 (b) has worked
unintended hardships upon the corporate insider. This is true because
the reorganization, whereby the insider has "purchased" the securi"The first prototype illustration set forth in the text is subject to several possible variations. Such variations include:
(i) Where the insider of A has made a sale of securities of B within six months prior
to the date of the reorganization (and prior to the date upon which he has become an insider of B), and where such prior sale of securities of B can be
matched with the subsequent acquisition of B's securities pursuant to the
corporate reorganization. It would appear that the possibilities for abuse of inside
information by the insider in this factual situation are the same as in the first
prototype illustration in the text. Moreover, under existing law, the fact that
such person was not an insider of B both at the time of prior sale and subsequent purchase would not relieve him of § 16(b) liability in the light of the
decisions in Blau v. Allen and Adler v. Klawans, cited in note 10 supra.
(ii) Where an insider of B purchases securities of A within six months prior to the
reorganization and then disposes of such securities in exchange for additional
securities of B upon the reorganization, you cannot match, insofar as the securities of B are concerned, two purchases of B's securities for purposes of § 16(b).
Nor could such liability be imposed under the facts of this illustration with
respect to trading in the securities of A since such person was never an insider
of A. In this type of transaction, however, it would appear that if the purchase
of A's securities prior to the re-organization was based upon an abuse of confidential information, a civil action would lie under rule lob-;. Compare the allegations
of the SEC in SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., et al. SEC Litigation Release No.
3235 (1965) which involved a sale of securities of A and a purchase of securities of B prior to the announcement of a proposed merger. One of the defendants
in this case was an insider of both A and B and the SEC is seeking an injunction
against further violations of rule lob-$ plus restitution to each person from
whom the defendants purchased securities of B and to whom they sold securities
of A prior to the date of public announcement of the merger.
Compare discussion concerning lack of realization of profit within the meanings of
S 16(b) in Heli-Coil v. Webster, cited in notes 27 and 28, supra. Significantly, the conclusion that there was no such realization in the Hell-Coil case was urged upon the Third
Circuit by the amicus brief of the SEC.
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ties of B, has presumably been consummated only after shareholders
of A have had an opportunity to pass upon and approve the acquisition and, therefore, the possibilities of the abuse of inside information in connection with such "purchase" of the securities of B, and
their subsequent sale do not seem materially significant. In fact, from
the standpoint of possible speculative abuses, it can be argued that
this prototype presents the strongest factual case against applying
section 16 (b) liability to a combination of two securities transactions,
one of which involves the transfer or exchange of securities incident
to a corporate reorganization. The insider in this illustration may well
have availed himself of inside information to sell securities within
six months after such reorganization; but, as noted in the first prototype, the insider has acquired the equity securities of B on a basis
equal to that of other shareholders of A and has obtained no advantage by reason of such acquisition which is not available to all of the
other shareholders of A. Therefore, the desirability of precluding
such insider from making a subsequent sale of the securities of B
in order to implement the purposes of section 16 (b) is rather doubtful. On the contrary, one of the questionable consequences of imposing liability under section 16 (b) to this combination of securities
transactions would be to deter--or at least delay-insiders of A from
becoming insiders of B upon the reorganization despite the fact that
such deterrence may be inconsistent with the legitimate corporate
objectives sought to be achieved by the reorganization."
When dealing with the question of matching transactions in the
securities of an issuer involved in a reorganization, the analysis of
the two prototype illustrations in terms of their susceptibility to
abuse by insiders of inside information furnishes substantial support
for the adoption of a rule by the SEC exempting the acquisition or
disposition of equity securities incident to a corporate reorganization
from the operation of section 16 (b)," e provided, however, that the
" See, e.g., Marquette Cement case, 239 F. Supp. at 965, where the court noted that
the acquiring corporation desired to have the insider of A become a director of B because
of his experience and background in the business being acquired pursuant to the reorganization.
" In proposing the rule exempting securities transactions incident to corporate reorganizations, this Article assumes that the SEC has the statutory power under the Exchange Act
to adopt such an exemptive rule pursuant to § 3 (a) (12), 3 (b) and 23 (a) of that statute,
as well as the express power in § 16(b) itself. This power was called into question with
respect to the adoption by the SEC of rule 16b-3 (17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (1956)) by the
Second Circuit in Greene v. Dietz, 143 F. Supp. 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) aff'd, 247 F.2d 689
(2d Cir. 1957) and the rule was subsequently held to exceed the SEC's statutory power by
a district court in Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). This resulted
in an amendment to rule 16b-3 which substantially limited the scope of the exemption
provided theretofore with respect to shares acquired under stock option plans meeting conditions set forth in the rule. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6257 (1960).
For a discussion concerning the question of the SEC's power to adopt rules exempting
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exemption should not be available where there has been a purchase or
sale of the equity securities of A prior to the reorganization plus a sale
or purchase of the equity securities of B after the reorganization (or
vice-versa), all within a six-month period. Subject to this proviso, this
exemption would be consistent with the purposes of the statute and
would avoid unintended liabilities. In addition, the proposed rule
should only exempt securities transactions incident to a reorganization where the only securities of B that are acquired consist of equity
securities. To the extent that cash or non-equity securities are acquired in connection with the organization, a profit may be deemed
to have been realized for purposes of the proposed rule. Thus, the
existence of some "boot" would not destroy the availability of the
entire exemption; and the exemption would remain available to the
extent that such profit had not been realized."
By reason of state statutory requirements and, in certain instances,
the requirements imposed upon listed companies by the various national securities exchanges, 7 these corporate reorganizations (except
for a voluntary exchange of securities of A solely for securities of B)
typically require shareholders' approval;" and all of such reorganizations do no involve any change in the proportionate equity interests of
insiders in relation to other shareholders of that same corporation.
Moreover, since section 16(b) is only applicable to issuers who are
also required to comply with the Commission's proxy rules under
section 14 of the Exchange Act, 9 and since such proxy rules require
comprehensive disclosure concerning the terms of such reorganization, the shareholders of A (and, in many cases, the shareholders of B
as well) will usually be furnished with adequate information concerning the material provisions of the corporate reorganization to
enable them to make an informed determination whether to vote in
certain transactions from § 16(b), see Kramer, An Examination of Section 16(b), 21 Bus.
LAW. 183 (1965). See also discussion in Meeker & Cooney, The Problems of Definition in
Determining Insider Liabilities Under Section 16(b), 45 VA. L. REv. 949, 971-75 (1959).
" This treatment of the receipt of cash and/or non-equity securities under the proposed
exemptive rule is analogous to the provisions of §§ 354 and 356 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, as amended with respect to the receipt of "boot" in certain types of taxfree reorganizations, i.e., while the receipt of the boot is taxable, it does not destroy the
tax free character of the reorganizations specified therein.
"7As an illustration, see NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL, pp. A-2 84-85

(Oct. 1961). The New York Stock Exchange requires that where a corporation proposes to
issue an amount of shares equal to or greater than approximately 20% of the theretofore
outstanding shares of such class, it is necessary to submit the transaction for approval by
shareholders to obtain the listing of such securities to be issued in connection with such
transaction. In effect, this rule of the New York Stock Exchange imposes upon the issuers
of listed securities a requirement of approval by shareholders regardless of the statutory requirements of the applicable state jurisdiction.
" See, e.g., Business Corporations, 6 McKINNEY's CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK,
55 903,
909 (1963).
s9Regulation 14 under the Exchange Act (17 C.F.R. 5 240).
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its favor. Therefore, with respect to that end of the combination of
securities transactions which consists of the acquisition or disposition
of a security pursuant to a corporate reorganization, the possibilities
of insiders' unfair use of inside information are practically nil. If,
despite the arguments in its support, the SEC were to object to promulgating the proposed exemptive rule with respect to all of the types
of corporate reorganizations referred to herein, it might consider
adopting the rule on a basis limited to those corporate reorganizations
where, pursuant to state law or stock exchange requirements, shareholders' approval is required and where the solicitation of such approval is subject to the SEC's proxy rules.
In addition, mergers, consolidations, and exchanges of securities for
assets are generally the kind of corporate transactions which are the
subject of the "no sale" theory under rule 133 "0 of the Securities Act
of 1933, as amended. "1 They involve what are essentially "corporate
acts" binding upon the insider and all other shareholders whose only
remedy, if they disapprove of the transaction, consists of exercising
statutory rights of appraisal.' The SEC, however, has apparently rejected the application of the "no sale" theory under rule 133 to the
question of liability under section 16 (b) ;" but since these reorganizations do involve "corporate acts" binding upon shareholders rather
than individual securities transactions by insiders, the analogy appears
valid, and it is legitimate to inquire why the "no sale" theory of rule
133 must be restricted solely to the question of exemption from registration of securities under the Securities Act. In this respect, the
restrictions in rule 133," which are designed to curb abuses arising
from subsequent unregistered distributions of securities issued pursuant to reorganization, have their analogue in the restrictions upon the
scope of the proposed rule exempting securities transactions incident
to such reorganizations from section 16(b) liability. Furthermore,
even though the rationale underlying rule 133 does not square entirely
with the voluntary exchange of shares by the shareholders of A for
the shares of B, nevertheless, as a practical matter insiders-and particularly insiders who are not controlling shareholders-often are not
in a position effectively to object to a proposed transfer of shares by
the shareholders of A in exchange for the shares of B. In terms of like
60 17 C.F.R. S 230.133.
61 77 U.S.C. § a-bb. This statute is hereinafter referred to as the "Securities Act."
2
0 Rule 133(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.133(a). See 1 Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION, 534-39

(1961).
63Id. at 526-27. As Professor Loss has noted therein, the SEC's amicus brief in the
Hodgkinson case argued for the non-applicability of the "no sale" theory to actions under
5 16(b). The Court's opinion in the Hodgkinson case makes no reference to that theory.

"See

Rule 133(b), (c), (d), 17 C.F.R. 5 230.133(b), (c), (d).
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treatment among all shareholders and resulting business consequences,
a voluntary exchange of securities stands on the same ground as the
other forms of reorganizations and there appears to be no warrant for
excluding such exchanges of securities-which are often selected as
the form for effecting the transaction to serve technical corporate or
federal tax purposes which are irrelevant to the purposes of section
16 (b)-from the scope of the proposed exemption.
Moreover, the imposition of liability under section 16 (b) to a combination of transactions which includes the acquisition or disposition
of an equity security incident to a corporate reorganization may hinder the insider, by threat of such potential liability, from acting solely in the interests of the corporation and its shareholders. Insiders
often have the power to prevent or delay the consummation of any
corporate reorganization, and they should not be placed in a position
where, to avoid section 16 (b) liability, they must delay the securities
transaction incident to the reorganization beyond the statutory sixmonth period. An exemption of the acquisition or disposition of the
equity security upon the reorganization from the operation of section

16(b) would eliminate the possible breaches of fiduciary duty which
might otherwise ensue by reason of continuing to subject such transactions to section 16 (b) liability.

Finally, it should also be noted that if an insider has actually used
inside information in purchasing or selling the equity securities of
either A or B prior to or after the date of reorganization, there are
presently adequate remedies available to hold such insider liable for
his breach of fiduciary duty in connection with such insider's purchase or sale of securities."' Since the purpose of section 16 (b) is restricted to an attack upon a combination of purchase and sale involv-

ing the possibility of unfair use of inside information, " its coverage
should not be extended in a manner beyond, and perhaps inconsistent
with, this specific purpose, particularly where such other remedies are
readily available.
What has been stated herein respecting corporate reorganizations
a' 17 C.F.R. § 240.1ob-5. The language of rule lob-5 is largely patterned after the language of § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 77(Q), of the Securities Act with respect to misrepresentations
and material omissions. The most significant distinction between rule 10b-5 under the Exchange Act and § 17 of the Securities Act is that the rule covers sellers of securities as well
as purchasers of securities. The civil liability implied from rule iob-5 has resulted in a
large number of decisions rendered by the federal courts and has also resulted in substantial
recoveries by defrauded purchasers and sellers of securities who have placed reliance upon
rule lob-s rather than upon the more circumscribed express civil remedies contained in the
Securities Act. For an interesting discussion of the implications of the development of law
under rule 1ob-5, see Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARV. L.
REv. 1146 (1965).
a' See text accompanying note 31 supra.
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is equally applicable to reclassifications of the securities of one issuer.
Reclassifications, which generally require shareholders' approval, are
frequently undertaken to recapitalize the issuer in order to meet corporate financial requirements or, more specifically, with a view to
a public offering of the issuer's securities. As in corporate reorganizations, the laws of the applicable states typically contain sufficient statutory safeguards to insure that all shareholders of the same class are
treated alike with respect to the securities exchanged upon such reclassifications." The holding in Roberts v. Eaton," where the reclassification was admittedly undertaken with a view to a public offering
of the securities of the issuer shortly thereafter, should be incorporated into the exemptive rule proposed herein.
Apart from the considerations which, upon analysis, would indicate that the acquisition or disposition of securities pursuant to a
reorganization ordinarily do not entail risk of speculative abuse, there
is one additional consideration which further supports arguments in
favor of the proposed exemptive rule. By reason of the amendment by
the SEC of rule 16b-9, there is presently a disparity in the treatment
accorded insiders who convert their securities, but who may have
purchased the convertible security or sold the security within six
months from the date of such conversion, as opposed to insiders who
acquire or dispose of an equity security incident to a reorganization
and who now can neither purchase nor sell the securities of either A or
B within six months from the date of consummation of such reorganization. It is indeed questionable whether this disparity is justified,
particularly in view of the fact that, except in the case of a forced
conversion," an insider's decision to convert securities may be made
solely on the basis of his personal financial considerations and regardless of action by other shareholders; whereas the decision to acquire
or dispose of securities pursuant to a reorganization involves corporate action by directors and shareholders upon which the insider may
have limited influence. The proposed exemptive rule would effectively
eliminate this disparity of treatment.
The considerations set forth above should not be construed as implying that there are no areas involving the acquisition or disposition
of equity securities pursuant to a corporate reorganization where the
possibility of speculative abuse is not genuine. Such possibilities, however, are restricted to instances where there has been a purchase or sale
7See, e.g., Business Corporations, 6 McKINNEY'S CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK,

55 804, 806(b)(6) (1963).

68212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1954).
" See discussion in Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d at 345-46. Cf. Pettys v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 526 (D. Minn. 1965).
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of the equity securities of A prior to the reorganization plus a sale or
purchase of the equity securities of B after the reorganization (or
vice versa), resulting in a realized profit, all within a six-month period. In this type of situation, it can be demonstrated that real possibilities of speculative abuse exist with respect to both sides of the
transaction. Accordingly, as noted above, any rule to be adopted by
the SEC should specifically restrict its application so as to exempt from
the operation of section 16 (b) only an acquisition or disposition of an
equity security incident to a corporate reorganization where there has
not been a combination of such sale and purchase of the equity secur-

ities of A and B within a six-month period, including the date of consummation of the reorganization. In effect, such rule should contain
restrictions analogous to those contained in amended rule 16b-9 exempting conversions and rule 16b-7 (c) exempting acquisitions or
dispositions of securities pursuant to reorganizations involving eightyfive per cent owned subsidiaries."'
The substance of the rule proposed herein has heretofore been recommended by the securities bar, but thus far the SEC has failed to
adopt it. If, despite the arguments advanced herein and the suggested
limitations upon the proposed rule, the SEC is of the view that
exempting from section 16(b) all acquisitions and dispositions of
equity securities incident to a reorganization would not be appropriate
because of the possibility of speculative abuse, particularly insofar as a
purchase of equity securities of A, or a sale of such securities of B,
prior to the reorganization are concerned (i.e., the facts of the first
prototype illustration above), then it should at least consider the adoption of a rule which would exempt from the operation of the statute
the acquisition pursuant to the reorganization of equity securities of
B when followed by a subsequent sale of such securities within six
months thereafter. For the reasons pointed out under the second prototype illustration, the acquisition of equity securities of B incident to a
reorganization does not appear to involve the possibility of abuse of
inside information prior to its consummation; and if such securities
are sold within six months after the date of such reorganization, but
70Rule 16b-7(c) restricts the exemption provided for acquisitions or dispositions of
securities pursuant to reorganizations among affiliated companies. The substance of rule
16b-7 is set forth in note 52 supra. The restriction under rule 16b-7(c) removes from the
scope of such exemption from § 16(b) transactions by an insider involving the purchase
(other than an acquisition pursuant to the reorganization) of a security of one of the companies which are parties to the reorganization plus the sale (other than the disposition of
a security pursuant to such reorganization) of another company which is a party to such
reorganization within any six month period during which such reorganization takes place.
This restriction upon the exemption for securities transactions involving reorganizations of
affiliated companies parallels that which is now set forth in amended rule 16b-9 and the
exemptive rule proposed in this Article.
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more than six months after the date upon which the equity securities
of A were purchased prior to such reorganization, it is difficult to discern how the purposes of section 16 (b) are implemented by subjecting the insider to liability by reason of such subsequent sale. This
limited alternative rule would at least serve the purpose of relieving
insiders from the harsh and questionable results reached in the Hodgkinson and Marquette Cement cases.
DETERMINATION OF PURCHASE PRICE OF SECURITIES
RECEIVED IN

CORPORATE CONVERSIONS AND

REORGANIZATIONS

Where section 16 (b) liability is imposed upon an insider for securities transactions arising out of a corporate reorganization or a conversion, determining the profit recoverable by the issuer may entail
difficulties often encountered in measuring the value of the securities
or assets exchanged or received. The statute speaks in terms of "profit
realized," and the Second Circuit's holding of this language in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp." has established a central precedent for interpretation of this statutory language. In the Smolowe case, the court
held that, in order to implement the remedial purposes of section
16(b), profits shall be so computed as to squeeze out all possible
profits from any series of transactions. Thus, the Second Circuit
stated its rule for determining realized profit to be that of "lowest in,
highest out" within any six-month period."' This would still hold even
though the matching of specific purchases and sales ( e.g., by way of
tracing actual certificates, the "FIFO" method, or otherwise) might
have resulted in an actual loss to the insider.
The courts, taking due note of the Smolowe doctrine, have arrived
at varying methods of valuation in conversion, reorganization and
reclassification situations. Such methods of determining the purchase
price of securities are illustrated by the following table of cases, which
also sets forth the dates selected by the courts upon which such
determination is to be made;

' 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). See also Gratz v.
Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1952); Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
'2 136 F.2d at 239.
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From this line of cases, both within and outside of the conversion
and corporate reorganization areas, one can draw fairly reliable conclusions with respect to the question of determining the purchase
price of securities for section 16 (b) purposes.
The value of the consideration given shall, as a general rule, determine the purchase price of the securities received. Accordingly, the
value of the shares or assets of A which are exchanged for the securities of B is likely to be relied upon by the courts in establishing the
purchase price for the determination of recoverable profit. The same
approach may also be deemed applicable to the determination of the
"purchase" price of the underlying security issued upon conversion of
the convertible security.
Where, as illustrated in the Babbitt, Graham-Paige and Marquette
Cement cases, the market value of the securities or assets of A is difficult to determine, the courts are likely to resort to a valuation of the
securities of B received upon the acquisition. This problem will normally be encountered where the securities of A are not actively traded
and it assumes, of course, that the securities of B have a readily ascertainable market value. In most instances, since section 16 (b) is only
applicable to issuers whose equity securities are either listed on a national securities exchange or are registered under section 12 (g) of
the Exchange Act, the securities of B are likely to have a readily
ascertainable market value.
In order to implement the Smolowe doctrine, which is designed to
squeeze out as much recoverable profit as possible from an insider's
securities transactions, it is most likely that the courts will select the
lowest sale price of the securities of A on the valuation date in establishing the purchase price for the securities of B. A recent illustration
of this approach appears in the Marquette Cement case. 3
In computing recoverable profit under section 16 (b), the courts
will probably include dividends received by the insider between the
date of his acquisition of the securities of B and the date upon which
he subsequently sells such securities. In Western Auto Supply v.
Gamble Skogmo, Inc.' and the Marquette Cement case the courts
included the amount of dividends actually received between the dates
of purchase and sale in computing the insiders' profits.' As a corollary,
73239 F. Supp. at 968.
74348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966).
7' 239 F. Supp. at 968, but see the holding of the district court in Blau v. Lamb, 242
F. Supp. 151, at 161 to the effect that a quarterly cash dividend was "too incidental" and
not "so inextricably connected" with the insider's purchases and sales as to be included in
computing profit realized under S 16(b) where the issuer had a history of paying quarterly
cash dividends for a period of at least one year prior to the dividend in question. This holding
was affirmed by the Second Circuit, CCH FnD. SEc. L. REP. 5 91,710 at 65,620. On the
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where the insider subject to section 16(b) has made a sale followed
by a purchase of the securities of B, dividends declared and paid by
B prior to the date of such subsequent purchase will apparently be
deducted in computing realized profit."s
SELECTING THE DATE OF PURCHASE AND
VALUATION IN CORPORATE REORGANIZATION

In the area of corporate reorganizations, the question of which
date is to be selected (for determining the purchase price of the securities and also for determining the date upon which such purchase has
occurred) is of considerable significance in imposing section 16 (b)
liability. This question will remain significant even if the SEC adopts
the rule recommended herein which would exempt acquisitions or
dispositions of securities pursuant to reorganizations. As indicated in
the table of cases set forth above, the principles which the courts
have relied upon in selecting a date are not susceptible to simple
restatement. In cases involving conversion of securities, the courts
have selected the date of conversion as appropriate for both purposes. However, with respect to reorganizations, the courts have, as
indicated in the above table, thus far arrived at varying, and seemingly inconsistent, results. There may be some justification for employing different criteria when applying section 16 (b) to different
types of corporate reorganizations. However, it would appear that,
regardless of the form of reorganization, one rule should guide the
courts in selecting the date of purchase because the securities transactions pursuant to all of such reorganizations involve the same considerations from the standpoint of section 16 (b). It would also appear
that the date to be selected should be that date upon which the insider becomes irrevocably bound and committed to acquire the securities pursuant to the reorganization, or, in other words, the date upon
other hand, the Second Circuit in this case reversed the district court's failure in matching
a sale of securities prior to a 100% stock dividend with a subsequent purchase of such securities after such stock dividend, to make a proportionate adjustment in the price per
share of the security subsequently purchased for the purpose of computing recoverable
profits under § 16(b). CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 91,710 at 65,619-20. See also Adler v.
Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959). Significantly, the district court in Marquette Cement distinguished the decision in Adler v. Klawans on the ground that Marquette Cement
involved the "possiblity" of insider manipulation of the dividend. The distinction, which is
consistent with the criterion relied upon in this Article with respect to a limited exemption
from 5 16(b) for acquisitions or dispositions of securities pursuant to a reorganization, is
probably the criterion upon which the courts should rely in determining whether to include dividends received in the computation of realized profit. One can rationalize the different results reached by the courts in the cases cited in this note on the basis of whether
the payment of the dividend in relation to the insider's transaction in the security presented
possibilities of speculative abuse.
7" See Falco v. Donner Foundation, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 90,612, resd on other
grounds, 208 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1953).
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which the insider's rights and obligations have been fixed with respect
to such acquisition." The merit in this approach is that it would relate
the date of purchase to substantive, as distinguished from procedural
or ministerial, considerations in determining when the insider has in
fact made his decision to acquire the securities of B. If this criterion
is applied, it should, in the absence of unusual circumstances, result
in the following determinations of the purchase date in the following types of corporate reorganizations:
(1) 'Where the reorganization involves a voluntary exchange of
shares between the shareholders of A and B, the date upon which such
exchange has been consummated should constitute the purchase date.
To select the date upon which the insider has entered into an agreement to transfer his shares (a date which typically occurs prior to
the consummation of such exchange) is unrealistic since such agreements are invariably subject to material substantive closing conditions prior to or following such agreement, and therefore the agreement date is an unjustifiably arbitrary one."
(2) If the reorganization involves an exchange of assets of A for
the securities of B which is followed by a liquidation of A, then the
date of purchase for section 16(b) purposes should be the date of
liquidation of A. The date of liquidation of A appears appropriate
because until such date the insider will not have become legally bound
to acquire the securities of B. While it is true that the insider may
have sufficient control of A to delay the date of liquidation of A beyond the six-month period, prior to such date it remains uncertain
whether the insider will receive the securities of B upon such liquidation.7" In this respect, the holding in the Marquette Cement case seems
correct. This suggested rule is subject to one caveat. Where A itself
becomes the insider of B by reason of A's acquisition of more than
ten per cent of a class of equity securities of B pursuant to the reorganization, then the appropriate date for section 16(b) purposes
would appear to be the date of consummation of the exchange of A's
for B's securities. Prior to that date, any contract to effect such ex"'See Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299, 301 (2d Cir. 1956). But cf.
Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954).
78In Fistel v. Christman, 135 F. Supp. 830-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), the district court,
without discussing the point, selected the date of sale of the shares as the date for determination of the fair market value of such shares in a case involving a voluntary exchange
of securities.
7"Significantly, under § 337 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, a corporation which has adopted a plan of complete liquidation has twelve months within which
to sell its assets, and to liquidate without incurring tax liability on the corporate level for
gain derived from the sale of such assets within such twelve month period. This federal
income tax statutory provision is one among several factors which furnish insiders with the
opportunity to delay the liquidation of the corporation after it has consummated the sale
of its assets in exchange for securities of another corporation.
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change would normally be subject to material closing conditions
which would leave uncertain the legal obligation of A to acquire these
securities. This approach is consistent with the holding of the court
in Stella v. Graham-PaigeMotors Corp."
(3) If the reorganization takes the form either of a statutory
merger or consolidation, then the date of purchase should be deemed
to be that date upon which such merger or consolidation has actually
been consummated. This recommendation is based upon the fact
that, apart from the technical consideration that such transactions
are not deemed legally to have been accomplished until the articles
or certificates of merger or consolidation have been properly filed
pursuant to the requirements of the states of incorporation of both
A and B, the standard agreement of merger or consolidation is subject to numerous material conditions, including approval of shareholders, prior to consummation. Until such date, therefore, the shareholders of A should not be deemed to have acquired the securities of
B pursuant to such merger or consolidation for section 16 (b) purposes.
The above recommended dates of valuation for section 16 (b) purposes in paragraphs (2) and (3) are subject, however, to the qualification that, depending upon the laws of the applicable jurisdiction,
any insider who has not voted his securities in favor of the acquisition should not be deemed to have "purchased" the securities of B
until such date as his statutory right of appraisal under state law
shall have, in fact, expired.
It is to be noted that the approach recommended herein differs
from the holding in the Hodgkinson case. While not entirely clear, it
appears that the Court in the Hodgkinson case held that the date of
purchase for section 16(b) purposes was the date upon which the
insider surrendered certificates evidencing the shares of A subsequent
to the liquidation of the subsidiary into its parents.8 The Hodgkinson
result seems hypertechnical since utilizing the date upon which certificates evidencing the securities are surrendered or received would
not appear significant for selecting either the date of valuation of the
purchase price of the securities or whether such date is within the
six-month period under section 16 (b). In this respect, the holding in
Marquette Cement, by selecting the date of dissolution of A on the
ground that upon such date the insider (a shareholder of A) was
legally bound to acquire the securities of B received by A pursuant to
8o 104 F. Supp. 830 (S.D.N.Y.

1952). See note 75 supra.
"tBlau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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the reorganization," probably represents a better approach to the
question.
CONCLUSION

The application of section 16 (b) to reorganizations, and reclassifications has therefore created a condition of uncertainty which is contrary to the public interest. The courts have struggled with the statutory definitions of "purchase" and "sale" and have frequently adopted
tortuous reasoning in order to avoid harsh results. It is evident that
clear rules of general application, upon which insiders and their counsel can rely, are unlikely to be forthcoming from the courts. The
logical solution to this problem is that the SEC use its exemptive and
interpretative powers to adopt a rule of general application and clear
understanding similar to the recent amendment to rule 16b-9.

8

Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962, 967 (S.D.N.Y.. 1965).

